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Rights, Rights, and Rights:
A Ward's Right to a Hearing,
A Guardian's Right to a
Standard, and an Heir's
Right to an Inheritance
A recent guardianshipdecision from a
Floridaappellate court bears close
scrutiny regardingdue process rights
and the right to "Medicaid Planning."

By Edward A. Shipe
"I

M

yrtle Mackey is eighty-six years
old. She was once a vibrant
person. But with the passage of
time and age, she has developed

a need for continuous assistance.

Mrs. Mackey lives in a nursing home in Martin
County, Florida.
Her relatives became concerned. Court proceedings ensued, she was adjudicated incapacitated, and
plenary guardians were appointed to exercise all of
her delegable rights.
The guardians initially find that Mrs. Mackey
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has approximately $78,725 in assets, and a monthly
income of $980.97.1 The guardians eventually petition for the authority to "gift out" to Mrs. Mackey's
family. By that time, the guardians have spent
$32,152.56, and keeping her in the nursing home
would deplete almost all of her assets and qualify
her for Medicaid benefits in less than eleven months. 2
Presumably, her family had hoped and expected to
receive some inheritance from her. In most situations,
she would have wanted her family to receive an inheritance.
In non-guardianship circumstances, an attorney
might well advise a client, perhaps using a power of
attorney or some other instrument, to "gift out" sums
of money on a set schedule, to help the person qualify
for government assistance, such as Medicaid, after a
given point in time. But not all persons possess the
wisdom of advance planning with experienced counsel. And guardianship, vexing in many situations,
again proves to be a prism through which not all
light passes.
The guardianship judge refuses to receive evidence and hold a full hearing.3 Instead, the court
receives proffers in the form of affidavits from two
witnesses. One witness asserts that the ward and the
family had undertaken such advance planning as joint
accounts, and that they had a close relationship. The
other witness, an attorney with expertise in elderlaw matters, asserts that the gifting would not
penalize Mrs. Mackey in receiving Medicaid benefits, and that such gifting is legal.'
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The judge denies the petition, finding that "Medicaid planning" is not in the ward's best interests.
An appeal is taken. The appellate court reverses the
trial court, holding that a hearing should have been
held, and that the court should have attempted to
determine what the ward would have wanted, i.e.,
the "substituted judgment" standard.
This scenario resulted in one of the most interesting guardianship opinions to come from a Florida
appellate court in recent memory. This article discusses the case of Rainey v. Guardianshipof Mackey,
6
reprinted here as Exhibit A.
The Rainey opinion discusses three very inter7
esting points, to be explored in this article in turn:
1. The due process rights of a ward' and a
guardian to an evidentiary hearing on matters in which a guardian seeks authority to
take an action.
2. Whether a guardian's decisions are to be
governed by "substituted judgment," determining what the ward would have wanted
to do, or by the ward's "best interests," a
subjective determination on the part of the
guardian.
3. Whether a guardian has the authority, or can
be granted the authority, to deliberately deplete a ward's assets to such an amount as to
qualify the ward for Medicaid assistance
payments.
The Right To A Hearing In Guardianships:
Don't Slam The Courtroom Door
Florida's guardianship code is a complicated labyrinth of statutes? The Florida Legislature desires the
appointment of guardians in only the most obvious
and needful circumstances. 10 A lengthy constitutional
discussion focusing on due process rights is probably not necessary, and in any event beyond the scope
of this publication. It should suffice to simply note
that under both the United States and the Florida
Constitutions, a person's right to life, liberty, and
property cannot be deprived by the government without "due process" of law.
A 210-year-old body of developing case law and
code has explored the contours of what "due process" means, what "liberty" means, and what "life"
and "property" mean. Over such a long period, the
definitions have been somewhat elastic, befitting a
nation that has grown from a small agrarian colony

to an urban superpower. In any event, the delegation of a person's rights by court order to a guardian
would seem to obviously implicate a person's right
to due process. And the failure to hold a hearing
before entering an adverse order would seem to obviously violate due process.
A number of recent Florida cases have reversed
trial courts that failed to hold hearings before entering orders. In one case,11 a trial court that summarily
cut a guardian's hourly rate from $25 to $5 was directed to hold a hearing and take evidence on a
reasonable hourly rate. In a separate decision,13
another trial court had written in a reduced
guardian's fee without a hearing. The trial court was
reversed and ordered to either grant the guardian's
requested fee or set a hearing.
And in Rainey, the court takes pains to note the
absence of a record from which a full statement of
facts could be drawn.
These cases comport with relatively elementary
appellate practice-a court wants a full record on appeal before rendering a precedent-setting decision.1 4 But
one perceives a hidden second hand at work: sensitivity to due process. Florida's code painstakingly preserves
a person's right to due process in a guardianship. The
rights to access the courts, to counsel, and to court
review of a guardianship can never be removed from a
person and delegated to a guardian."5
In some cases, with limited assets, a court may
be tempted to skimp on a hearing to save on legal
fees. Nevertheless, in important decisions affecting
a ward's welfare, it is incumbent on trial courts to
give a ward and a guardian the opportunity to form
a full record, so that an appellate court has a fair
chance to undertake a complete review.
One is reminded of the famous dictum of Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson: "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
because we are final." The higher one goes in the
court hierarchy-from trial court to court of appeal
to Supreme Court-the higher the level of infallibility, if not always finality. Of course, the hierarchy is
evidence of how much our society values due process: if one court acts unjustly, there should be
recourse by appealing to a higher court.
A skeptical guardianship court should err on
the side of holding a hearing on a questionable
request. In this fashion, even if the judge's skepticism manifests into an adverse ruling, at least the
persons involved will have a better feeling that their
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arguments were fully heard-and a better opportunity to correct any errors on appeal.
"Substituted Judgment" versus
"Best Interests": Is That Your Final Answer?
A guardian faces two possibilities in the decisionmaking process: to base a decision on what the ward
would have wanted, or to base a decision on what
the guardian thinks is best for the ward. The former
is called the "substituted judgment" standard; the
latter is called the "best interests" standard.
Many Florida cases apply the "substituted judgment" standard, i.e., the guardian tries to determine
what the ward would have wanted to do. 16 For example, decisions involving the disposition of property
involve basing a decision on what the ward would
have wanted. 17 The Rainey decision follows the notions that a ward's desires should be paramount in
determining how and whether to dispose of property, and that a guardian's subjective involvement in
decision-making should be minimal.1 "
However, other Florida decisions apply the "best
interests" standard, primarily in the area of personal
rights such as medical decisions, residential decisions,
and social decisions.1 9 "Under this standard, the
charge of the guardian is to make an independent
decision on behalf of the ward." 20 Generally, the
guardian takes a parental role and does what "is
best" for the ward, though the action taken may not
be what the ward wants.
One's best reconciliation of the cases is that "substituted judgment" applies in situations involving
property, or in situations where the ward's intent can
be clearly divined, such as with living wills or advance directives. "Best interests" would apply to
personal decisions or in situations where there is no
clear evidence of a ward's intentions.
A ward's intentions are sometimes clear. For example, an account is found titled in two names, the
ward and a family member. That usually expresses
an intention to have the second person receive the
funds when the ward dies.
In other situations, intentions are murky. People
do not always make wills or otherwise plan for their
older years. People do not always make logical decisions about their property or their person. In these
situations, a guardian is hard-pressed to simply watch
as the "intentions of the ward" result in the dissipation of assets, or the placement of a ward in a
detrimental social situation.
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Florida's courts are likely to be called on again
for assistance in determining what standard governs
a guardian's decisions. Some guardianship cases involve long-standing family "feuds" or "tugs-of-war,"
which eventually become fountains for adjudication
by guardianship courts. Such a case is likely to end
up as another court precedent from an appellate
court, and in that fashion the "tug-of-war" between
these two concepts of decision-making may eventually result in coherent law.
Whether A Guardian Can Engage In Medicaid
Planning: Is That Your Final Question?
The ultimate question involved in Rainey, the issue
that generated the greatest interest among local practitioners, involved the authority of a guardian to
"spend down" a ward's assets in order to qualify for
Medicaid. 21 It is a question ultimately left undecided,
though the opinion appeared to have at least a tiny
skepticism that anyone could engage in such planning, let alone a court-appointed guardian.
A guardian often faces two awful choices: either
watch the nursing home "spend down" a ward's assets, or become proactive and "spend down" the ward's
assets through gifting and donating. In Florida, the
choices are especially common, given the high cost of
nursing home care and the large number of low- and
middle-income persons who spend their retirement
here.22 In any event, the ultimate destination is the same:
the receipt of government assistance through the Medicaid program.
Medicaid was enacted as part of the "Great Society" initiatives of the 1960s. "It reflected the
contemporary focus on poverty." 23 The intention

behind the program was to provide a safety net for
indigent persons, in the same vein as AFDC and food
stamps. "Medicaid enabled many eligible poor
people to go to doctors for the first time in their
lives. ' ' 24 In later years, Medicaid became a mecha-

nism for the reimbursement of nursing homes. Once
a person's assets had been spent down to nothing by
the costs of the nursing home, that person could receive Medicaid benefits, regardless of how wealthy
the person had been.
There is a certain counterintuitive quality to
"Medicaid planning" by a person or by a guardian.
In essence, a person is rendering himself or herself
"poor," regardless of their wealth or class, in order
to receive payments from the government. "After the
program was enacted, there was concern over the
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widespread divestiture of assets by mostly wealthy
individuals so that those persons could become eligible for Medicaid benefits. As a result, Congress
enacted laws that imposed periods of ineligibility for
such benefits where the applicant divested himself
25
or herself of assets for less than fair market value."
It is this counterintuitive aspect to "spending
down" which may receive the disapproval of some
guardianship judges. Some may well focus on what
the ward would have wanted with respect to postmortem provision for family and for heirs. But others
may focus on whether a ward would have wanted
to be "poor" and dependent on government assistance. The answers are likely to vary from case to
case, and are often not likely to be obvious. The decisions are likely to vary from judge to judge.
Whether there is a better system that would provide for older persons while protecting an estate is
debated and debatable. 26 We have learned to expand
the "quantity" of life, but as guardians and elderlaw attorneys well know, we have not learned how
to continue the "quality" of life. Though many of us
are likely to live well into our eighties and nineties,
our memory of time before those years is likely to be
dim, and our ability to maintain our lives during
those years will probably be minimal.
As our population continues to age, the debate
over how to provide for our older population is likely
to grow louder, and hopefully become more focused.
As we post-Yuppies have often observed, the
Boomers certainly will change many things, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse. Though,
as the economist John Maynard Keynes once noted
in the 1930s, "in the end we are all dead."
The "final question" may not be whether a
Endnotes
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guardian may engage in "Medicaid planning," but
rather two separate questions:
1. Must a guardian protect heirs as well as
wards, given the present imperfect system?
2. How much is society willing to care for older,
incapacitated persons without impoverishing
them?
The ultimate answer may lie not in the law, but in
medicine and research. There would be no guardianships, and no nursing homes, and no "elder-law"
specialty, if people could retain their faculties well into
old age. Whether there is any real prospect of that eventuality is well beyond the scope of this article.
In any event, the ability of a guardian to engage
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like Florida's patchwork of election laws and county
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Conclusions
(1) Guardianship courts should err on the side
of having full hearings on a guardian's request for
action.
(2) The "final answer" between the substituted
judgment and best interests standards has not been
reached in Florida.
(3) The "final question" may not be whether
persons can "spend down" an estate, or how we can
pay for elder care without impoverishing an estate,
but rather how science can help ease the burden of
an older person's final years. The answer to that
final question would not appear to be in sight.
also appreciates the assistance of attorney Michael
Connors, Esq., who, as the Court notes, presented
evidence in the Rainey matter in the form of a
proffer. The ultimate opinions and assertions in this
article are solely those of the author, who, depending on your point of view, gets either all the credit
or all the blame.
7. The absence of anyone arguing the opposing point
of view may be another interesting point. But it is a
point probably more appropriate to a text on
appellate practice, and so is not discussed in this
article. At the oral argument, Judge Stevenson of
the three-judge panel asked counsel, whimsically,
whether he would be arguing both sides of the case.
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scope of this article.
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continued to live with a medical system that led the
world in its training of physicians and in technological wizardry but that was also bureaucratically
complicated and far from comprehensive."
PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 576.

